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The paper investigates the determinants of international business cycle comovement in a
two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model featured by monopolistic
competition and nominal price rigidity, following so the New Open Economy Macroeconomy
(NOEM) literature. Within this framework, we assess the role of labor market search and
matching frictions in the international propagation of supply and monetary shocks.
Our results show that labor market frictions improve the ability of the New Open Economy
Macroeconomy framework to account for international business cycles comovement. In particu-
lar, the NOEM model with labor market search is consistent with the international propagation
mechanism of monetary shocks identiﬁed in the data. Through their impact on labor market
dynamics, labor market institutions aﬀect the magnitude of international comovement. Busi-
ness cycle synchronization is thus found to increase with the generosity of the unemployment
beneﬁts system, whereas it decreases with the strictness of employment protection.
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11 Introduction
There is a longstanding interest in the determinants of international business cycle interdependence,
as attested by the central place devoted to understanding the international propagation of shocks in
the traditional international macroeconomics textbooks. The topic has been substantially renewed
in the last two decades with the emergence of the international Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature.
Incorporating fully micro-founded theoretical grounds in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) framework, the two-country RBC model of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) opens the
route to promising research in the ﬁeld of international business cycles. Yet, two limits of this
literature may be underlined. First, international RBC models that typically assume ﬂexible prices
in a pure walrasian setting fail to account for some key dimensions of international stylized facts.
In particular, the predicted cross-country GDP correlation is too low as compared to the data
(Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1995). Second, and inherently given its “real” nature, this literature
faces inability to account for the international transmission of monetary shocks.
Relative to the ﬁrst point, Hairault (2002) introduces labor market search and matching frictions
à la Pissarides (1990) in the international RBC model. He shows the relevance of adding these
frictions to better understand the propagation of international ﬂuctuations arising from productivity
shocks. Relative to the second point, Kollmann (2001) departs from the Real Business Cycle
paradigm to adopt the New Open Economy Macroeconomy (NOEM) framework (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 1995) featured by monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. Within this framework,
he shows the importance of nominal rigidities in the international transmission of monetary and
supply shocks. These results point out the role of nominal rigidity in explaining cross-country GDP
correlations among OECD countries.
Our paper builds on these references, as we amend the New Open Economy Macroeconomy
setting to introduce labor market search and matching frictions. Our contribution to the literature
is then to show the relevance of this framework in the international propagation of supply and
nominal shocks and the extent of international business cycles synchronization.
In assessing the ability of the NOEM framework with labor market search to account for interna-
tional comovement, we adopt the following reasoning. It is well understood that the ingredients of
the New Keynesian framework (monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities) are key elements
if willing to model the eﬀects of real and nominal shocks, as convincingly established by Kollmann
(2001). This framework therefore constitutes the “natural” benchmark to which compare our model’s
results. To that aim, we develop a version of the model without labor market search, only featuring
sticky prices on the monopolistic-competing goods market (denoted “SP” hereafter, for Sticky Price
2model). We then evaluate the performances of our open-economy New Keynesian model with labor
market search and matching frictions (denoted “MM” hereafter, for Matching Model) in light of
the SP model. This strategy allows us to evaluate the role of labor market frictions in enhancing
the international propagation of supply and demand shocks, relative to the vector of international
transmission provided by nominal price stickiness.
Some papers have recently introduced labor market search in the New Keynesian framework in
a closed-economy setting. Krause and Lubik (2007) reach the conclusion that labor market search
and matching frictions do not improve performances of the New Keynesian model regarding output
and inﬂation dynamics. Yet, this view does not make consensus in the literature. Walsh (2005)
and Trigari (2004) indeed obtain that the inclusion of labor market search into a New Keynesian
framework improves the ability of the model to explain the response of output and inﬂation along
a number of dimensions. Sveen and Weinke (2008) show that combining sticky prices and labor
market frictions in a DSGE model contributes to better explain ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and vacancies in the occurrence of supply and demand shocks. We pursue this line of research
by addressing the question of their relevance regarding international comovement. Campolmi and
Faia (2006) and Poilly and Sahuc (2008) also include labor market frictions within the New Open
Economy framework. Their objectives diﬀer from ours though, since they focus on the role of cross-
country heterogeneity of labor market institutions on macroeconomic performances of countries
within a monetary union. The contribution of Fonseca et al. (2008) is closer to the point addressed
here, as they tackle the international business cycle comovement issue. Similarly to Campolmi
and Faia (2006) and Poilly and Sahuc (2008) but in contrast to us, they focus on the role of cross-
country divergence in labor market institutions on that topic. Besides, they leave aside the question
of monetary shocks and nominal rigidities by sticking to a purely international RBC model.
We develop a two-country DSGE model embedded in the New Open Economy Macroeconomy
framework, i.e. featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities on the goods market.
Labor markets in each country are subject to search and matching frictions. As in Hairault (2002),
ﬂuctuations in labor input result from both changes in hours and changes in employment. We
assume that wages and hours are periodically negotiated between ﬁrms and workers according to
an eﬃcient Nash-bargaining process. Behaviors are aﬀected by labor market institutions in place,
captured here through labor taxes and unemployment beneﬁts.1
We show that labor market search and matching frictions improve the ability of the New Open
Economy Macroeconomy framework to account for international comovement. Our results may be
1As detailed later in Section 5, we view the job destruction rate as being related to the degree of employment
protection. This interpretation leads us to evaluate the role of this dimension of labor market institutions as well.
3summed up in three points. First, we show that labor market frictions substantially amplify the
responses of the main macroeconomic variables to either supply or monetary impulsions, and in a
way consistent with empirical evidence. In quantitative terms, our model better accounts for the
eﬀects of money shocks on GDP than the pure New Keynesian framework without labor market
frictions. In contradiction with Krause and Lubik (2007) but in line with Trigari (2004) or Walsh
(2005), this result conﬁrms the role of labor market frictions in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks. Our analysis leads to attribute a signiﬁcant role to the exogeneity assumption of the job
destruction rate combined with the endogenous choice of worked hours in accounting for this result.
From this respect, our paper contributes to better understand the divergence of conclusions reached
in the literature so far. Second, we show the particular relevance of embedding labor market fric-
tions in the New Keynesian model in an international setting. Introducing labor market frictions
indeed enables the NOEM model to be consistent with the international propagation of monetary
shocks identiﬁed in the data. In quantitative terms, this raises the cross-country correlations of
macroeconomic variables, while making the model also consistent with the main labor market cycli-
cal properties. Third, we evaluate the role of product and labor market regulations in business cycle
comovement. We notably show that labor market institutions substantially aﬀect the magnitude of
international comovement through their impact on labor market dynamics. Besides, the impact is
not unequivocal among the dimensions of labor market institutions considered. We thus ﬁnd that
international business cycle synchronization increases with more generous unemployment beneﬁts,
while it decreases with the strictness of employment protection. An empirical exercise conﬁrms that
these predictions are supported by the data in OECD countries.
The paper proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the building blocks of model. In Section 3,
we evaluate the role of labor market frictions within the New Keynesian framework, as a vector
of propagation of technological and monetary shocks. Section 4 presents the cyclical properties of
the model. Section 5 reports a sensitivity analysis to key parameters of the model, i.e. the degree
of nominal price rigidity and those capturing the design of labor market regulations. Section 6
concludes.
2 The New Open Economy Macroeconomy framework with labor
market search
2.1 Description of the model
We build a two-country DSGE model featured by monopolistic competition and sticky prices on
the goods market and matching frictions on the labor market. Before developing further, let us
4motivate our modeling choices. First, we retain an eﬃcient Nash-bargaining process, as hours are
periodically subject to negotiations between ﬁrms and workers. Some recent contributions rather
advocate in favor of a right-to-manage setting, where only the real wage is negotiated and ﬁrms freely
choose hours (Christoﬀel and Linzert, 2005 notably). There is no consensus in the literature on that
point though. As noted by De Walque et al. (2008), if the right-to-manage setting provides good
performances from the inﬂation persistence point of view, it leads to unsatisfactory results regarding
the behaviors of key labor market variables. Due to the large ﬂexibility given to ﬁrms, labor
adjustments mainly occur through the intensive margin channel, implying implausible responses in
hours and strongly reducing employment volatility. We thus adopt the eﬃcient Nash-bargaining
framework, following so the large bulk of papers in the related literature (Hairault, 2002, Chéron
and Langot, 2004, Trigari, 2004, or De Walque et al., 2008, among others). Second, we assume
an exogenous job destruction rate. Yet, Den Haan and Watson (2000) suggest that endogenizing
this dimension magniﬁes the output eﬀects of supply shocks, as well as making them much more
persistent. Krause and Lubik (2007), Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2005) adopt a similar assumption.
Yet, this comes with the drawback that most labor adjustment occurs through the ﬁring channel,
which has been recently contested by the empirical ﬁndings of Shimer (2007) and Hall (2005).2;3 We
consequently discard the endogenous job destruction behavior modeling, to assume an exogenous
job destruction rate. We come beck further in the analysis on the role of these modeling choices in
our results.
The world economy is divided in two countries, country 1 (home) and country 2 (foreign).
Inﬁnitely-lived households consume a continuum of diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods, produced by monop-
olistic ﬁrms distributed over an interval [0;1] in each country. Nominal price rigidity is modeled
through quadratic adjustment costs on prices (Rotemberg, 1982). Money is introduced in the model
through a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption purchases. The following sections describe
the behaviors of the agents.
2.2 Labor market ﬂows
In each country, employment is predetermined at each time and changes only gradually as workers
separate from jobs at the exogenous destruction rate s, or as unemployed agents ﬁnd jobs. Let Nit,
Hit and Vit, respectively be the number of employed workers, of hirings and the number of new jobs
2It has to be noted that the results of Shimer (2007) and Hall (2005) are still debated in the literature. See Yashiv
(2007).
3From a more technical point of view, endogenous job destruction serves to reintroduce some ﬂexibility in the
short run in the standard matching model where capital and employment stocks are predetermined, as in Krause and
Lubik (2007). However, such an assumption is not needed here given the instantaneous adjustment in worked hours.
5made available by ﬁrms in country i. Then employment in country i evolves according to:
Nit+1 = (1   s)Nit + Hit i = 1;2




it (1   Nit)1  ; 0 <   < 1
with Uit = 1   Nit unemployed workers in period 1 (where total labor force is normalized to 1).
The parameter   measures the ﬁrm’s share in the match and  > 0 is a scale parameter measuring
the eﬃciency of the matching function.
Due to the time-consuming nature of search on the labor market, a vacant job can at best become
productive only one period after time has slipped by. Deﬁning by 'it = Hit
1 Nit the probability to
ﬁnd a job for unemployed workers, the law of motion of employment in country i becomes :
Nit+1 = (1   s)Nit + 'it(1   Nit) (1)
2.3 Households
Each country is populated by a large number of identical households whose measure is normalized
to one. Each household consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents. As frequent in the RBC
labor market literature (Andolfatto, 1996, among others), we assume complete income insurance
markets. Consequently, the optimal households’ behavior is derived using a dynamic program where
ex-post heterogeneity on the labor market does not matter: risk-averse households insure themselves
fully against heterogeneous wealth positions. We thus derive the optimal workers’ decision rules by
solving the program of a representative household.
The household’s consumption choice can be decomposed into two steps. First, the representative
household optimally solves her intertemporal program, facing each period a budget constraint and a
cash-in-advance constraint on her consumption expenditures. Second, she determines the allocation
of total consumption between domestic and foreign varieties, depending on their relative price and
the elasticity of substitution between national varieties (). Within a basket of national variety,
the household optimally sets her demand for each diﬀerentiated good, depending on its relative
price and of the elasticity of substitution (). Based on related empirical evidence, we assume that
the elasticity of substitution between goods is lower between domestic and foreign varieties, than
between two national varieties (ie,  < ).
In what follows, we present the optimizing program of the household in country 1 (that of the
foreign household can be inferred by symmetry). We ﬁrst describe the intratemporal consumption
allocation across goods, before determining the intertemporal consumption choices.
6The intratemporal program In each country, the consumption bundle Cc
it aggregates across
diﬀerentiated varieties produced by domestic and foreign ﬁrms. The consumption bundle in country
















with 0 <  < 1 and  > 0. 1  represents the share of imported goods in the consumption basket
of goods and  the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign baskets of goods. C1t
and C
1t respectively denote the amounts of local and imported varieties consumed by the domestic
household.
Consumption indexes for each national variety are deﬁned over a continuum of diﬀerentiated
goods produced by ﬁrms in monopolistic competition. For the domestic and foreign varieties con-





















with  the elasticity of substitution across goods and c1t(z) (resp. c
1t(z)) the amount of good z
produced by a ﬁrm located in country 1 (resp. country 2) and consumed by the domestic household.




































with p1t(z) (resp. p
1t(z)) the price of variety z produced by a domestic ﬁrm (resp. foreign) ﬁrm and
sold in country 1. Pc
1t is the country 1’s consumption price index, P1t and P
1t are the expenditure-
minimizing price index of each domestic and foreign aggregates consumed in country 1. Prices





























2t(z) the prices of foreign variety z sold in the domestic and foreign
markets (expressed in local currency) and et the nominal exchange rate (deﬁned as the price of











The instantaneous utility function is speciﬁed as:
U (Cc
it;hit) = log(Cc
it) + Nit n(1   hit)1 l
1   l
where the ﬁrst term is the utility from ﬁnal good consumption, while the second part represents
the disutility from work by supplying hit units of hours (total time endowment being normalized to
unity). l is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure, while  n measures
the relative utility of leisure. In country i, Nit jobs are productive at the beginning of period t,
which represents the probability of employment for each household’s member.
The domestic household maximizes her expected discounted sum of utility ﬂows (6) subject a
sequence of three constraints: the law of motion of employment (1), a cash-in-advance constraint
on her consumption purchases (7) and her budget constraint (8) :
Pc
1tCc
1t  M1t (7)
Pc
1tCc




+(1   N1t)b1t + R1tB1t + R2tetB




8Equation (8) reports the domestic household’s budget constraint. As in Christoﬀel and Linzert
(2005), we assume that when employed, household members receive the wage payments net of
direct taxes (w), while when unemployed they receive unemployment beneﬁts which are evaluated
in consumption units (b1t). The household’s resources are also made of the detention of ﬁnancial
assets. We retain the assumption of incomplete international ﬁnancial markets, as a large strand
of the related literature underlines the role of this assumption in the international transmission of
shocks (Kollmann, 2001, among others). Our modeling of ﬁnancial markets follows Rabanal and
Tuesta (2006). We assume that domestic households are able to trade in two nominal riskless bonds
denominated in domestic and foreign currency respectively. These bonds are issued by home-country
residents in the domestic and foreign currency to ﬁnance their consumption. As in Rabanal and
Tuesta (2006), we make the simplifying assumption that foreign residents can only allocate their
wealth in bonds denominated in foreign currency. We also suppose that households face a cost of
taking positions in the foreign bonds market. This assumption allows us to cope with the issue of
non-stationarity implied by the incomplete asset markets framework.4 Costs on adjusting foreign
assets position (denoted CA1t) are paid in terms of composite good and scaled by the parameter










Last, the household enters the period with an initial stock of money (M1t). She also receives




The period’s resources are used for consumption, demand for nominal balances (M1t+1) and
ﬁnancial assets (B1t+1 and B
1t+1), taking into account adjustment costs on foreign assets transac-
tions. As detailed below, each period worked hours and wage (before tax) are the Nash-bargaining
result of negotiations between ﬁrms and workers. When solving the intertemporal program, the
household consequently takes them as given. Her objective is to maximize Equation (6) subject to









with the household’s state variables SH
1t = fM1t;N1t;B1t;B
1tg. First-order conditions with respect
4Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) investigate the quantitative diﬀerences implied by alternative approaches in the
literature to induce stationarity. They ﬁnd that all versions deliver virtually identical dynamics at business cycle
frequencies.
9to Cc
1t, M1t+1, B1t+1 and B

























where 1t denotes the multiplier associated to the budget constraint.
2.4 The ﬁrms
The program of an individual ﬁrm Firms are distributed over a interval [0;1] in each country.
In a monopolistic competition setting, each diﬀerentiated ﬁrm sets its prices and quantities taking
consumption price indices and aggregate demand functions as given. In what follows, we present the
program of country 1’s ﬁrm z (that of a foreign ﬁrm can be inferred by symmetry). For notational
simplicity, we suppress the z index from now on. Small letters refer to individual variables while
capital letters refer to aggregate ones.
Nominal price rigidity is introduced by quadratic costs on adjusting prices, that are written









y1t; P > 0
with y1t individual output of ﬁrm z. As 1 represents the steady-state gross inﬂation rate in country
1, adjustment costs are null at the long term equilibrium. Price adjustment costs are paid in terms
of composite good.
The domestic ﬁrm z accumulates physical capital according to the following law of motion:
k1t+1 = (1   )k1t + ic
1t (12)
with ic
1t the investment bundle of ﬁrm z and 0 <  < 1 the depreciation rate. Firms face quadratic







; I > 0
Matching frictions on the labor market imply that ﬁrms have to post vacant jobs to recruit
workers, denoted v1t for ﬁrm z in country 1, given the cost of job posting  ! (paid in terms of
composite goods). To preserve homogeneity of demand functions, the various adjustment costs as
well as the investment bundle are assumed to have the same CES structure as the consumption one.
10Technologies are identical across countries (up to asymmetric technological shocks) and across




1  0 <  < 1 (13)
n1t is the number of workers in ﬁrm z, and h1t the number of worked hours per worker. Technology
levels are assumed to follow a joint ﬁrst-order autoregressive stochastic process:
logA1t+1 = a logA1t + a12 logA2t + (1   a   a12)loga + "a
1;t+1 +  a"a
2t+1 (14)
logA2t+1 = a logA2t + a12 logA1t + (1   a   a12)loga + "a
2;t+1 +  a"a
1t+1 (15)
where loga is the mean of the process and {"agt is the vector of innovations serially independent
and correlated between countries. We have E["a
1] = E["a
2] = 0 and E["a
1;"a0
2 ] = 0: The parameter  a
governs the cross-correlation between technological innovations.
Each monopolistic ﬁrm z faces a demand function for its goods emanating from both countries.













with D1t demand for the aggregate domestic variety coming from domestic agents, and D2t demand




P2t are the relative prices
of the domestic good z with respect to the aggregate domestic variety in the home and foreign
countries respectively.
Extending optimal good-demand functions (Equations (2) to (5)) to other good-demand motives,
both domestic and foreign demand for domestic variety can be expressed as functions of relative






























it +  !Vit + CIit + CPit + CAit
Aggregate investment Ic
it is deﬁned as
R 1
0 ic
it(z)dz. Aggregate adjustment costs on capital (CIit),
on prices (CPit) and on international ﬁnancial transactions (CAit) are similarly deﬁned, as well as
 !Vit, that represents the demand of goods devoted to job posting in country i.5
5Note that CA2t = 0 given our assumption that foreign households have no access to international trade in
ﬁnancial assets.
11Each individual ﬁrm chooses a contingency plan, that maximizes the expected discounted value
of the dividends ﬂow. Given its vector of control variables CF
1t = fv1t;k1t+1;n1t+1;p1t;y1tg and of
state variables SF





























subject to the technological constraint (13), the demand function (16), the law of motion of physical
capital (12), and that of labor force given by:
n1t+1 = (1   s)n1t + q1tv1t (17)
with qit = Hit
Vit the probability that a vacant job is matched in country i = 1;2. 0 < f < 1 is
the employer’s labor tax rate. As domestic ﬁrms are hold by the representative household, the
discounted rate is the ratio of the multipliers associated with the budget constraint, since that ratio
reﬂects the consumer’s variation in wealth.




















































































with 1t the multiplier associated with the demand function (16) and 1t  Pc
1t1t the domestic
household’s marginal utility of wealth in real terms.
Equation (18) represents the optimal choice of capital accumulation. Firms invest in physical
capital until the cost of investment (qT
1t) equals the expected return on investment, which is given
by the expected resell price of capital, lower than the true marginal productivity by the mark-up
12rate. Equation (19) highlights the trade-oﬀ faced by ﬁrms regarding job posting. Firms are enticed
to post vacant jobs such as the cost of job posting (  !
q1t) is equal to the expected return of a match.
As well as in Equation (18), the expected marginal return of employment is lower than the true
marginal productivity, given the mark-up rate the monopolistic ﬁrm can extract. Last, Equation
(20) gives the optimal pricing decision of the ﬁrm. Absent nominal price rigidity (P = 0), the
mark-up rate is constant, equal to  = 1
 1. As long as ﬁrms face adjustment costs on prices
(P > 0) mark-up rates are endogenous and ﬂuctuate following nominal and real perturbations.
Aggregating across ﬁrms Given the assumption of symmetry across ﬁrms within a country,
the aggregate level of capital stock Kit, employment Nit, vacancies Vit and output in each country















From now on, we consider aggregate variables in the reasoning, eventually adapting equations
to that aim. In particular, the Nash bargaining program will be solved by considering that surplus
from matches are shared by the representative household on the one hand, and the representative
“aggregate” ﬁrm on the other hand.
2.5 Negotiating the labor contract
In each country, the labor contract stipulating the real wage and the amount of worked hours is
periodically determined via generalized Nash bargaining between individual workers and their ﬁrms.












@Nit the marginal value of a match for




@Nit the marginal value for a match for a worker in country i.  denotes the
ﬁrm’s share of a job’s value in the bargaining process.











































with it  Vit
1 Nit labor market tightness in country i. The solution of the bargaining process in
country 2 can be derived by symmetry.
As reported in Equation (22), hours are bargained so that marginal return of worked hours
equates the worker’s marginal disutility of labor expressed in terms of real wealth. In the monop-
olistic setting, the marginal return on hours departs from their marginal productivity, since the
monopoly power of ﬁrms enable them extract positive rents. Equation (23) shows that the repre-
sentative worker’s wage bill is a weighted average of the worker’s contribution to output, plus hiring
costs per unemployed workers (ﬁrst term of RHS of (23)), and the worker’s outside options, that
are related to the gap between unemployed and employed workers’ revenues expressed in terms of
real wealth (second term of RHS of (23)). As underlined by Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005), under
eﬃcient Nash-bargaining, any change in wage is accompanied by a change in hours, so that the
“true” measure of ﬁrms’ marginal labor cost is not the real wage, but the household’s marginal rate
of substitution of consumption and leisure (Equation (22)). Besides, as shown by the presence of
1t in Equation (23), the monopolistic power of ﬁrms allows them to drive the real wage down in
the bargaining process, since the marginal return of employment is lower than the true employment
marginal productivity.
2.6 Government and central bank
In each country, the monetary aggregate evolves as:
Mit+1 = Mit + Xit
With Xit speciﬁed as Xit = (git  1)Mit, this implies the following law of motion for money supply:
Mit+1 = gitMit (24)
with git the monetary growth factor in country i.
The modeling of central banks’ monetary policy is a topic extensively debated. Starting from
Taylor’s (1993) paper, the literature points out that the actual monetary authorities behavior is
correctly approximated by an endogenous interest rate rule. Accordingly, we assume that in each
country the central bank gradually adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate Rit in response
14to deviations of output, inﬂation and money growth from their steady state values Yi,  i and gi













+ "r;it i = 1;2 (25)
The serially uncorrelated innovation "r is normally distributed with mean zero and standard devi-
ation r: Parameters y and  are strictly positive as long as the objective of the central bank is
to stabilize inﬂation and output. As discussed in Clarida et al. (2000), OECD central banks have a
tendency to smooth interest rates, which implies 0 < r < 1:
This modeling implies that monetary growth factors git are endogenous. For a given interest
rate set by the central bank in country i, gi adjusts so as to equilibrate the money market given the
households’ money demand function.
Every period, the government has a balanced budget. The increase in the money supply and tax
revenues are transferred to the local household as lump-sum transfers. Transfers Tit endogenously






it = Tit + (1   Nit)bit
with the unemployment beneﬁt level speciﬁed as a function of the wage bill in each country:
bit = ub withit
with ub the unemployment beneﬁt ratio assumed to be exogenous and constant.
2.7 Equilibrium
Absent any idiosyncratic shock, equilibrium is symmetric within a country and all ﬁrms set the
same price:




The model is closed by taking into account the equilibrium conditions on the foreign assets market:
B
1;t+1 + B
2;t+1 = 0 (26)





2t = P1tY1t + etP
2tY2t (27)
As in Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) or Kollmann (2001), we impose the ex-post equilibrium condition
on the domestic assets market, i.e. B1t+1 = 0.
15Finally, taking into account the diﬀerent market equilibrium conditions in the households’ budget
constraint, we obtain the law of motion of ﬁnancial assets in the home country, that is the evolution
of its balance of payments:
etB
1t+1   R2tetB
1t = P1tY1t   Pc
1tDc
1t (28)
After having transformed the relevant equations so that they become stationary, the long-run
equilibrium is determined. Equations are then log-linearized around the steady state according to
Farmer’s (1993) methodology.
2.8 Calibration
Calibration of the structural parameters is made on a quarterly basis. It is reported in Tables 1, 2
and 3.
Table 1: Calibration of structural parameters (1)
      l h N I P
B
NX 
0.36 0.99 0.025 0.85 6 1 4 0.33 0.93 7 20 0.0038 1
Calibration of  is based on Kydland and Prescott (1982). The discount factor  is set to 0.99,
which corresponds to a real annual interest rate is equal to 4%. The depreciation rate of capital
is about 10% a year, implying  = 0:025 on a quarterly basis. The steady-state value of imports
to GDP (1   ) is set equal to 0.15 consistently with US data, and as in Hairault (2002). The
steady-state gross inﬂation value of   is (arbitrarily) set to 1. Following Basu and Fernald (1997),
we set the mark-up rate of price over marginal cost to 0.2, implying a value for the price elasticity
of demand  equal to 6. For the G7 countries, a vast consensus estimates the elasticity between
national varieties  between 0 and 1.5. We follow the literature (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001 among
others) by setting  = 1. As in Chéron and Langot (2004) and Hairault (2002), we choose l = 4
so that the average individual labor supply elasticity is equal to 0.5, consistently with the bulk of
empirical micro-estimates. As standard in the labor market literature, the steady-sate value for
hours is set to h = 1=3 (Chéron and Langot, 2004). Based on the empirical results of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001) on major developed countries, B is calibrated so that B=NX = 0:0038,
with NX the steady-state value of exports. The capital adjustment costs parameter I is taken
from Patureau (2007), and close to Kollmann (2001), which calibrate the value in order to match
the relative volatility of investment in the G7 countries. With regard to the degree of price stickiness
(P), most empirical papers using macroeconomic data obtain average time intervals between price
16adjustments in the range of one year. However, when disaggregated prices are examined, prices
appear to be much more ﬂexible. Bils and Klenow (2004) thus estimate a mean duration of prices
of 5 months using US price data. In contrast, but still using micro-data on US prices, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) estimate that prices change on average every 8 to 11 months. We retain an
intermediate value and calibrate P such that the implied average duration of the price contract
amounts to 9 months.7
Table 2: Calibration of structural parameters (2)
s ub f w    q
0.08 0.129 0.064 0.158 0.6 0.6 0.7
The parameters related to the labor market functioning are calibrated on values commonly used
in the literature, mostly based on US data. Their calibration is displayed in Table 2. The weight of
vacant jobs in the matching function is set equal to   = 0:6, within the range of reasonable values
suggested by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We preserve the Hosios condition by setting  = 0:6
as well. As a result, wage and hours bargaining is such that trade externalities on the labor market
do not distort equilibrium. However, distortions due to the monopolistic competition setting still
remain. The probability that a vacant job is matched is set to 0.7, as in Den Haan and Watson
(2000) and Krause and Lubik (2007). The quarterly job destruction rate s is set to 0.08 following
Shimer (2005). The unemployment rate is set to 0.12 as in Krause and Lubik (2007).8 We calibrate
tax rates values (f;w) and the unemployment beneﬁt ratio ub  b=wh to match the corresponding
average values observed in the United-States over the period 1980-2003 (see Appendix A.1 for a
detailed description of sources and variables).
Table 3: Calibration of structural parameters (3)
a a a12 "a  a12 y  r r
1 0.906 0.088 0.00852 0.13 0.5 1.5 0.7 0.0025
Table 3 reports the calibration of the stochastic technological process and the Taylor rule in the
model. The technological process parameters are taken from Backus et al. (1995), with the steady-
state technology level a set to 1. Parameters y,  are calibrated according to the standard Taylor
7See Keen and Wang (2007) for the mapping between quadratic adjustment costs on prices and Calvo’s (1983)
type of price stickiness.
8As noted by Krause and Lubik (2007), this value is higher than observed unemployment, in order to allow for
potential participants in the matching market such as discouraged workers and workers loosely attached to the labor
force. This calibration strategy is adopted in a large number of business cycle models with search and matching
frictions (see Andolfatto, 1996 or Trigari, 2004, among others).
17(1993) rule (and frequently used in the literature, see Christoﬀel and Küster, 2008 among others).
The interest rate smoothing parameter r follows Clarida et al. (2000). The standard deviation of
the Taylor rule innovation is based on estimation results obtained by Ireland (2004a), and close to
those estimated by Rabanal and Tuesta (2006).
3 Labor market frictions and the international propagation of shocks
The objective of the paper is to assess the role of labor market frictions in the international prop-
agation of shocks. This section analyzes the predictions of the model in qualitative terms, i.e.
by focusing on the impulse response functions (IRFs hereafter) of main macroeconomic variables
to exogenous shocks. We successively analyze the IRFs to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks
and to interest rate rule shocks. As exposed in the Introduction, we evaluate the performances of
our NOEM model with labor market matching frictions (labeled “MM” hereafter), in light of those
achieved by a “pure” New Keynesian version (i.e. featuring monopolistic competition and sticky
prices on the goods market but no labor market frictions, labeled “SP” model). IRFs analysis is
driven accordingly.
3.1 IRFs to technological shocks
Figures 2 and ?? report the responses of main macroeconomic variables in response to a 1% increase
in the home TFP (A1) in period 1, in both models.9
As noted by Hairault (2002), one limit of the international RBC model refers to its predictions
of negative international comovements of labor input and investment in the advent of country-
speciﬁc supply shocks. Since capital ﬂows are the primary channel of international transmission,
the productivity diﬀerential drives investment up in the country positively hit by the total factor
productivity shock, and downwards abroad. Employment dynamics reinforces the negative interna-
tional transmission, as a positive technological shock in one country induces a positive wealth eﬀect
at the world level, which implies a decrease in labor supply in the other country. The model based
on monopolistic competition and sticky prices also fails on that front, as shown by Figures 2 and
??. The SP model indeed predicts a negative international comovement of worked hours and in-
vestment, that are accounted for by similar mechanisms. This is no more the case in the presence of
search frictions on the labor market. As reported by Figures 2 and ??, the NOEM model with labor
9Note that in the SP version, there is no vacant jobs given the absence of labor market search frictions. As well,
there is no adjustment through the extensive margin (the number of employed workers), so Nh is simply h.
18Figure 1: Dynamics following a home supply shock (1)






























































market search predicts positive international comovements in outputs, labor inputs and investments
in response to supply shocks. The underlying mechanisms may be summed up as follows.
The immediate increase in domestic production comes from two sources, the direct eﬀect of the
rise in TFP and the increase in worked hours. Given the international spillover of the supply shock,
similar eﬀects occur in the foreign country. In both countries, and despite the positive wealth eﬀect
of the technological shock, households agree to bargain over an increase in worked hours, since it
is accompanied by an increase in the real wage. As shown in Figure ??, ﬁrms in both countries
start opening vacant jobs instantaneously, so as to be able to produce more the second period on
through an adjustment at the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin. As a result, from
the second period on the negotiated amount of worked hours reduces in both countries because of
the positive wealth eﬀect of the supply shock, and labor market adjustment rather occurs through
changes in the employment stock. The combined dynamics of the employment stock and individual
worked hours explains the gradual increase in total employment in both countries, hence the positive
international comovement of total employment.
As in Hairault (2002), the particular dynamics of employment induced by search frictions, inter-
acts with that of investment to account for the positive international comovement of investments as
well. Higher employment in the foreign country indeed compensates for the capital outﬂow due to
the negative TFP diﬀerential. By increasing the marginal productivity of foreign capital, this mech-
19Figure 2: Dynamics following a home supply shock (2)






























































anism leads to a positive international comovement of investments.10 This analysis therefore extends
Hairault’s (2002) results to the NOEM framework. Embedding labor market frictions enables the
New Keynesian model to generate positive international comovement of outputs, investments and
labor inputs arising from productivity shocks. Next section pursues on this route by gauging their
relevance in the international transmission of monetary policy shocks.
3.2 IRFS to monetary shocks
Figures 3 to 7 thus report the impulse response functions to a 1% decrease in the domestic inter-
est rate occurring in period 1. IRFs analysis proceeds as follows. We focus on the transmission
mechanisms in our NOEM model with labor market frictions. We then highlight the diﬀerences
in IRFs relative to the sticky-price version of the model (“MM” vs “SP”). We ﬁnally confront these
predictions to empirical evidence, as it provides us with a way to (eventually) discriminate among
the two models.
Labor market frictions and the monetary transmission mechanism The rationale under-
lying the IRFs of the model with matching frictions is the following.
In the home country, the inﬂationary eﬀect of the loosening of monetary policy negatively
10The model also predicts an positive response of consumptions in both countries, the rise being larger in the
country directly hit by the shock. The whole set of IRFs are not reported here for sake of space saving, but they are
available upon request to the author.
20Figure 3: Dynamics of a home monetary policy shock (1)


































































aﬀects domestic consumption given the cash-in-advance constraint. The household escapes the
inﬂationary tax by favoring leisure and investment in physical capital, which leads to an increase
in domestic aggregate demand (Figures 3 and 4). The intertemporal smoothing behavior of the
household entices her to invest in ﬁnancial assets as well. Through the external account dynamics,
this induces a positive international transmission of the home monetary shock. Foreign consumption
and investment increase, and demand for goods rises at the world-wide level.
This expenditure-shifting eﬀect exerts an upward pressure on production in both countries.
Conversely, the expenditure-switching eﬀect due to the real exchange rate depreciation (Figure 7)
favors domestic production at the expense of foreign one. As shown by Figure 3, the expenditure-
shifting eﬀect dominates as outputs in both countries increase, leading to a positive comouvement
in GDP in response to monetary shocks.
Given expansion in world demand, ﬁrms in both countries have a strong incentive to negotiate
an increase in worked hours on impact when the shock occurs, given the predetermined levels of
employment and capital stocks. Conversely, workers have a strong incentive to bargain a reduction
in worked hours, as their outside option increases with the wealth eﬀect. This is particularly the case
in the home country, where consumption is hit by the inﬂationary tax. As displayed in Figure 5, the
Nash-bargaining process then results in an increase in worked hours accompanied by an increase in
wage, particularly in the home country. The second period on, as soon as employment and capital
stocks can be adjusted to production, ﬁrms are less willing to accept high wages when negotiating
21Figure 4: Dynamics of a home monetary policy shock (2)
































































the labor contract, to rather adjust through the extensive margin. This accounts for the decrease
in real wage and in worked hours the second period on (Figure 5). This comes at the beneﬁt of an
increase in stocks, as shown by the signiﬁcant rise in capital (given the investment boom on impact)
and employment, consecutive to the opening of new vacancies the period of the shock (Figure 5).
Figures 6 and 7 report the IRFS of interest rates, inﬂation and exchange rates. As shown by
Figure 6, the reduction in the domestic nominal interest rate is accompanied by a similar reduction
in the foreign interest rate (even though weaker). The nominal exchange rate depreciation indeed
implies a reduction in imports prices in the foreign country. This drives foreign inﬂation downwards,
hence the nominal interest rate given the Taylor rule. Given nominal price stickiness, the reduction
in the foreign nominal interest rate outweighs that in inﬂation. Consequently, real interest rates
decrease in both countries (Figure 6). Since the domestic nominal interest rate remains persis-
tently lower than abroad during the transition dynamics, the nominal exchange rate displays an
overshooting dynamics consistently with the uncovered interest rate parity, as reported in Figure
7. Depreciation in home currency translates into a real exchange rate depreciation given nominal
price stickiness.
IRFs to money shocks: comparing the models What is the role of labor market frictions in
the propagation of monetary shocks? As a ﬁrst answer to this question, we compare the IRFs to
the home monetary policy shock predicted by our model (“MM” model) to those obtained in the
22Figure 5: Dynamics of a home monetary policy shock, matching model


































































sticky-price version (“SP” model).
Two main results emerge. First, embedding labor market frictions in the New Keynesian model
substantially magniﬁes the eﬀects of monetary shocks. This result emerges from the comparison
of responses of macroeconomic aggregates in Figures 3 and 4. This is also the case with respect
to exchange rates, as nominal and real depreciations are ampliﬁed in presence of labor market
frictions (Figure 7). Second, the two models strikingly diﬀer regarding the predicted eﬀects of
the home monetary shock abroad. The SP model predicts a negative international comovement
of investments and aggregate demands, whereas it is positive when the model incorporates labor
market frictions. Further, inﬂation, nominal and real interest rates increase in the foreign country
with the home monetary shock in the SP model, while they decrease in the MM model.
This divergence of results may be related to the current account dynamics. In presence of
labor market frictions, the increase in home output outweighs that of home aggregate demand.
The resulting surplus of production exported abroad induces a positive wealth eﬀect in the foreign
country, leading to a rise in foreign aggregate demand. The opposite occurs in the SP model, where
the domestic country has to borrow from abroad to ﬁnance her excess of absorption on production.
The resulting negative wealth eﬀect in the foreign country drives foreign consumption, investment
thus aggregate demand downwards (Figures 3 and 4). Given the home bias in preferences, foreign
ﬁrms are then enticed to respond to the increase in world aggregate demand driven by the home
country by raising mark-up rates rather than quantities. This leads to an increase in prices of
23Figure 6: Dynamics of a home monetary policy shock (3)


























































foreign goods, hence in the foreign consumption price index despite the reduction of import prices
(Figure 6). Given the increase in both foreign output and inﬂation, the Taylor rule implies a rise
in the foreign nominal interest rate, which also drives the foreign real interest rate upwards (Figure
6 and 7).
IRFs to money shocks: comparing with empirical evidence The question is then, how
well do these IRFs ﬁt the data? As underlined by Christiano et al. (1999), despite the various
techniques of identifying money shocks, there is a reasonable consensus on the following eﬀects.
After a positive monetary shock, output ultimately rises, exhibiting a hum-shape response with a
peak value reached at around 6 quarters. Consumption and investment increase, the latter being
more responsive to the initial shock, and employment increase after a delay. Kashyap and Mojon
(2003) obtain similar VAR results on European countries. On the nominal side, empirical studies
typically obtain that inﬂation goes up in the home country and nominal and real exchange rates
depreciate. On the nominal exchange rate response speciﬁcally, the literature agrees on evidence of
nominal exchange rate overshooting, even though there is little consensus whether this overshooting
is delayed or not (see Karamé et al., 2008 for a survey on the topic).
As shown by Figures 3 to 7, the predictions of the New Keynesian model with labor market
frictions are broadly consistent with these empirical results. Two limits may be underlined though.
First, consumption contracts with a positive money shock, while it increases in the data. This is
24Figure 7: Dynamics of a home monetary policy shock (4)



































































a well-known limit of the models that introduce money through a cash-in-advance constraint, as
shown by Christiano (1991) in a closed-economy setting. Second, if the model successfully accounts
for the hump-shaped GDP response to the interest rate shock, the degree of persistence is too
low as compared to the data (the peak is reached at 2 quarters versus 6 in the data). Despite
these limitations, the model with labor market frictions and nominal price rigidity is consistent
with related evidence on the empirical eﬀects of monetary shocks. In quantitative terms notably,
embedding labor market frictions in the New Keynesian model allows to match the magnitude of
the GDP eﬀects of the interest rate shock observed in the data. The peak GDP value is estimated
to be equal to half the interest rate change in the USA (Christiano et al., 1999), in Germany and
in France (Kashyap and Mojon, 2003) and one third in the Euro area (Kashyap and Mojon, 2003).
The sticky-price model performs poorly on that side, predicting a GDP increase by 26% for a 100
basis point fall in the nominal interest rate. In presence of labor market frictions, this amounts to
a 44 % decrease, an order of magnitude in line with the data.
A key issue of the paper is tied to the international propagation of monetary shocks. Using
VAR models on the G7 countries, Kim (2001) ﬁnds that an US expansionary monetary policy
shock raises output, consumption and investment abroad. Besides, this positive spillover eﬀect
seems to primarily occur through the world capital market, as the US policy shock induces a
decrease in both US and non-US real interest rates, thereby stimulating aggregate demands for
goods in both the US and abroad. Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995) also ﬁnd evidence of a positive
25international comovement in GDPs in response to a US monetary policy shock, using VAR models
on the G7 countries. As shown by the previous IRFs analysis, the model with labor market frictions
and nominal price rigidity successfully accounts for the international monetary policy mechanism
identiﬁed in the data.
This aspect of the international transmission of monetary policy shocks also provides us with a
way to discriminate among the two models. If the New Keynesian model correctly accounts for the
positive GDP comovement in response to monetary shocks, it yields counterfactual results in a large
number of related dimensions. The SP model indeed predicts a rise in the nominal and real interest
rates abroad, as well as a negative comovement in aggregate demands, while the opposite is found
in the data. The sticky-price model thus does not prove to be consistent with the international
transmission mechanism of monetary shocks identiﬁed by Kim (2001). Conversely, we show that
the inclusion of labor market frictions reconciles the New Open Economy Macroeconomy model
with empirical evidence on that front.
4 A quantitative assessment
This section analyzes the performances of the model in quantitative terms. Statistics reported
in Table 4 are obtained from 500 simulations of the theoretical series that are ﬁltered according
to Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997) methodology, when the model is subject to technological shocks
(column A), to monetary shocks (column B) and to both shocks (column C). Column D reports the
same cyclical properties obtained in the sticky-price version of the model (subject to both types of
shocks) and Column E those observed on US data (see Appendix A for a detailed description of
sources).
With regard to within-country moments The New Keynesian model with labor market search
correctly matches the volatility of output, even though it is slightly too low as compared to US data.
Labor market frictions and nominal price rigidity play an important role in this result, as they both
act as substantial propagation mechanisms of exogenous shocks to output. One the one hand, adding
labor market frictions in the sticky-price model increases output volatility substantially (from 1.19%
to 1.58 % in Table 4). On the other hand, the MM model predicts a standard deviation of output
equal to 1.60% in the advent of supply shocks, while it amounts to 1.29 % in Hairault’s (2002) “pure”
RBC model with labor market search but no goods market frictions.11 This comparison underlines
the relevance of modeling both types of frictions in accounting for output ﬂuctuations.
11This comparison is relevant as we and Hairault (2002) adopt the same calibration of technological shocks.
26Table 4: A quantitative assessment of the model
Matching model SP model Data
TFP shocks Mon. shocks Both shocks Both shocks
A B C D E
Volatility
Y 1.60 0.05 1.58 1.19 1.92
C 0.66 1.92 0.66 0.78 0.71
I 1.95 6.28 1.96 2.23 2.44
h 0.19 1.15 0.17 0.24 0.23
w 0.72 3.12 0.68 0.74 0.46
 0.46 1.66 0.46 0.51 0.17
R 0.39 2.00 0.40 0.45 0.21
  0.29 1.32 0.31 0.10 3.59
e 0.91 4.56 0.91 1.10 3.84
Nh 0.61 1.54 0.60 - 0.91
U 4.37 6.04 4.34 - 5.74
V 6.25 15.24 6.16 - 6.95
Persistence (order 1)
Y 0.809 0.582 0.807 0.759 0.873
 0.703 0.111 0.668 0.495 0.543
Within-country correlations
(Y;C) 0.985 -0.138 0.984 0.982 0.870
(Y;I) 0.993 0.690 0.990 0.961 0.809
(Y;h) 0.379 0.813 0.419 0.519 0.652
(Y;w) 0.642 0.559 0.672 0.874 0.416
(Y;Nh) 0.860 0.996 0.856 - 0.873
(U;V ) -0.779 -0.745 -0.781 - -0.89
(U;) 0.895 -0.840 0.877 - -0.16
Cross-country correlations
(Y1;Y2) 0.760 0.091 0.742 0.614 0.610
(Cc
1;Cc
2) 0.688 -0.186 0.673 0.435 0.340
(Ic
1;Ic
2) 0.800 0.255 0.763 0.320 0.570
(Nh1;Nh2) 0.917 0.086 0.914 0.449 0.360
Notes: Simulated moments obtained with 500 simulations. Standard deviations of variables are
relative to Y .
27Table 4 shows that technological shocks play a leading role in driving GDP ﬂuctuations in the
model, while monetary policy shocks have a very limited role. This result is not necessarily surprising
given the relatively low standard deviation of the monetary innovation. The limited quantitative
importance of the policy shock is also found by Ireland (2004b) and Ireland (2003) in the post-1980
period on US data. This is consistent with the Leeper et al. (1996) view that “most movements in
monetary policy instruments are responses to the state of the economy, not random deviations by
the monetary authorities from their usual patterns of behavior”. As a result, the cyclical behavior
of macroeconomic variables is dominated by productivity shocks, as in Krause and Lubik (2007).
The model matches the order of volatility, as investment is more volatile than output, itself
more volatile than consumption. It also correctly accounts for the correlation of GDP with the
main macroeconomic variables (consumption, investment, employment), even though correlations
are slightly too large. Conversely, the model with labor market search underpredicts the volatility
and procyclicity of worked hours, and the sticky-price version performs better on this aspect. This
result can be accounted for by recalling that all changes should occur through hours in the sticky-
price model, given the absence of adjustment possibility at the extensive margin. Besides, this
better result on worked hours comes at the expense of deteriorated performances regarding real
wage dynamics, which is too volatile and procyclical in the SP model. The presence of labor market
frictions improves the performances of the New Keynesian model regarding the cyclical behavior of
the real wage, even though it remains too volatile and procyclical as compared to the data.12
Moreover, modeling labor market search and matching frictions enables the model to embrace
a large number of dimensions of the labor market cyclical behavior, which the sticky-price model
is incapable of by nature. This notably contributes to disentangle the behaviors of worked hours
and total employment. The model with labor market search thus matches the observed volatility
diﬀerential between total employment (Nh) and hours (h). In that case indeed, most of the variance
in total employment takes place through an adjustment at the extensive rather than the intensive
margin, consistently with the data. The model also replicates the Beveridge curve (i.e. the negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies jobs), whatever the type of shocks and with an
order of magnitude in line with the data. The model’s performances are less satisfactory with
12Hall (2003) and Shimer (2005) have initiated a vivid debate in the literature regarding the role of real wage
rigidity. They argue that this mechanism improves the ability of DSGE models to account for the correlation between
unemployment and vacancies. Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) show that it helps reproducing inﬂation persistence. This
(unsolved) debate leads us to build a variant of the model with real wage rigidity. We ﬁnd that real wage stickiness
reduces volatility of the real wage, while increasing its persistence as well as inﬂation persistence, consistently with
the literature’s ﬁndings. However, results related to the international comovement issue are left unaﬀected by the
real wage rigidity. For sake of space saving, we consequently do not report these results here. They are available
upon request to the author.
28respect to the Phillips curve (i.e. the negative correlation between unemployment and inﬂation).
Chéron and Langot (2000) show that embedding monetary shocks in a New Keynesian framework
with labor market search frictions allows to also reproduce the Phillips curve. Consistently with
their ﬁndings, the model generates a negative correlation between unemployment and inﬂation in
response to demand shocks, while it is positive in case of supply shocks. Unlike Chéron and Langot
(2000) though, given the relative size of shocks here, when both types of innovations simultaneously
occur the correlation between unemployment and inﬂation is positive, in contradiction with the
data.
Krause and Lubik (2007) argue that labor market search and matching frictions do not improve
performances of the New Keynesian model regarding inﬂation and output dynamics. Even more,
they ﬁnd that this framework generates counterfactual labor market dynamics, notably the inability
to replicate the Beveridge curve. Our results stand in sharp contrast with this view. As shown by
the comparison of Columns C and D of Table 4, volatility and persistence in output increase with
the inclusion of labor market frictions in the New Keynesian model, therefore bringing the model
closer to the data. Further, the MM model generates a substantial degree of inﬂation persistence,
even in the absence of real wage rigidity. Last, Table 4 shows that the model with labor market
frictions correctly replicates the Beveridge curve, whatever the nature of shocks. In contrast to
Krause and Lubik (2007), our results thus support the ﬁndings of Trigari (2004), Walsh (2005) or
Sveen and Weinke (2008) in closed-economy frameworks, that labor market frictions improve the
performances of the New Keynesian model in matching the dynamics of macroeconomic variables
along a large number of dimensions.
This divergence of results can be attributed to the modeling of labor market ﬂows. In Krause and
Lubik (2007), the only possibility for ﬁrms to adjust idiosyncratic shocks is through the endogenous
job destruction rate, as employment is predetermined and there is no intensive margin through
worked hours. This modeling may be criticized from both empirical and theoretical aspects. On the
empirical side, the role of job destruction ﬂows in accounting for employment ﬂuctuations is highly
controversial (see Shimer, 2007 and Hall, 2005). By allowing for this single channel only, Krause and
Lubik (2007) attribute an overwhelming role to job destruction ﬂows in comparison to the data. On
the theoretical side, the role of job destruction as the single endogenous margin of employment
adjustment removes much of the internal propagation mechanisms of labor market search and
matching frictions. This feature notably contributes to the major failure of the model in replicating
the negative correlation between unemployment and vacant jobs found in the data. These elements
thus call for an alternative modeling of labor ﬂows, that widens the set of adjustment possibilities
on the labor market. Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2005) preserve the assumption of endogenous job
29destruction but add the ability for ﬁrms to modify the employment intensive margin through the
amount of worked hours. This limits the magnitude of adjustments occurring through the job
destruction rate channel, which notably allows to replicate the Beveridge curve.13 In comparison
with Trigari (2004) or Walsh (2005), our framework shuts down the endogenous job destruction
channel while maintaining adjustments through both worked hours and the employment stock.
This joined assumption contributes to account for the ability of the MM model to replicate the
Beveridge curve. Trigari (2004) also notes that allowing for labor input variations at the extensive
margin reduces the elasticity of real marginal costs to output, which raises persistence in inﬂation
and output responses to exogenous shocks obtained in the New Keynesian model. This result also
applies in our framework, as shown in columns C and D of Table 4. The proximity of our results with
those of Trigari (2004) or Walsh (2005) suggests that they would remain robust to the modeling of an
endogenous job destruction rate. More broadly, our ﬁndings underline the importance of modeling
other adjustment channels than job destruction in accounting for the business cycles properties of
main labor market and macroeconomic variables. In this appropriate setting, and in contrast to
Krause and Lubiks’s (2007) view, our results demonstrate the relevance of adding labor market
frictions in the New Keynesian model.
With regard to international business cycles properties With regard to exchange rates
movements, Table 4 conﬁrms the widespread view that monetary shocks are needed for the model
to generate suﬃcient exchange rate ﬂuctuations. When the model is hit by monetary shocks only,
the model correctly matches the relative volatility of the nominal exchange rate. However, the real
exchange rate inherits a limited part of it despite the presence of nominal price rigidity. Moreover,
the magnitude of nominal and real exchange rates ﬂuctuations is far too low when both supply
and nominal shocks occur, in both models. Despite this limitation though, including labor market
frictions improves the performances of the NOEM model, as it increases the predicted exchange
rates relative volatilities. Consistently with IRFs analysis, labor market frictions amplify the eﬀects
of nominal price stickiness on exchange rate movements.
Regarding international comovement of quantities, the New Keynesian model with labor market
frictions accounts for the signs of the cross-country correlations of main macroeconomic variables,
13To understand these results, consider the eﬀects of an expansionary monetary shock. In Krause and Lubik’s
(2007) framework, ﬁrms reduce the job destruction rate in response to the positive demand shock. This implies a
fall in unemployment, a rise in labor market tightness, hence a fall in the probability of ﬁlling new vacancies. Job
creation therefore vanishes. This leads to a concomitant reduction in unemployment (U) and job vacancies (V ), in
contradiction with the Beveridge curve. By contrast in Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2005), the ability for ﬁrms to adjust
through worked hours limits the magnitude of adjustments occurring though job destruction. As a result, following a
demand shock their models predict a decrease in job destruction and an increase in job creation, therefore replicating
the negative correlation between unemployment and job vacancies found in the data.
30whatever the type of shocks occurring in the world economy. The only exception is the cross-country
correlation of consumption in the advent of monetary shocks. Due to the cash-in-advance constraint,
the model predicts a contraction in home consumption altogether with an increase abroad. However
when both types of shocks occur, the cross-country correlation of consumption is correctly signed.
Table 4 also shows the ability of the model to predict a large cross-country GDP correlation. By
contrast, international RBC models typically fail in front of the “quantity puzzle”, i.e. they do not
capture the high degree of comovement among industrialized countries. The seminal two-country
RBC model of Backus et al. (1995) thus predicts a negative cross-country GDP correlation (0.61
in the data). Hairault (2002) and Kollmann (2001) make notable contributions on that topic.
Hairault (2002) highlights the role of labor market frictions in enhancing GDP comovement in the
occurrence of supply shocks. Kollmann (2001) stresses the importance of nominal rigidities and
monetary shocks on business cycle comovement as well. However, none of these models is able to
generate enough international interdependence in GDP: the cross-country GDP correlation remains
too low, as compared to the data.14 Modeling both types of frictions substantially improves the
results, as the model does not fail in front of the quantity puzzle. This comforts previous IRFs
results, that both types of market frictions are needed in order to account for international business
cycle comovement.
Somehow paradoxically, the model even tends to overestimate the degree of international comove-
ment. In most cases, cross-country correlations are too large relative to the data. The sticky-price
version of the model performs better on that front, by generating a degree of international comove-
ment closer to stylized facts (even though too large). Yet, we do not view this result as signifying
that labor market frictions are not needed to explain the extent of international interdependence.
First, our whole set of results (both qualitative and quantitative) show that labor market search
frictions substantially complement nominal price rigidity as a key mechanism in the international
propagation of shocks. Second, Table 4 shows that cross-country correlations are quite large in
the advent of supply shocks, but of a much lower magnitude in case of nominal shocks. Given
the relative size of monetary innovations though, cross-country correlations are not substantially
lowered when both types of shocks simultaneously occur. Rather than dismissing the importance of
labor market frictions per se, we consequently view these results as suggestive of the potential role
of adding other sources of shocks in the New Keynesian model with labor market search, which is
left for further research.
14Hairault (2002) reports a cross-country GDP correlation equal to 0.29 (for standard preferences) while it amounts
to 0.42 in Kollmann (2001). Besides, both models predict a cross-country correlation in GDP lower than in consump-
tion.
315 The role of product and labor market regulations
Previous sections have put into evidence the role of labor market frictions and nominal price rigidity
in the international propagation of exogenous shocks. We investigate that point further by assessing
how these product and labor market regulations aﬀect the magnitude of international ﬂuctuations.
We thus conduct a sensitivity analysis to the values of three related parameters, the price adjustment
parameter P, the unemployment beneﬁt ratio ub and the job destruction rate s. In doing so, we
adopt a broad interpretation of the degree of price stickiness as capturing the extent of product
market regulations on the good market. We evaluate the role of labor market institutions in two
dimensions, the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt system and the strictness of employment
protection.15 The higher the unemployment beneﬁt ratio ub, the more generous the unemployment
insurance system. We capture the role of employment protection through the job destruction rate
value s. We indeed interpret a lower job destruction rate (and, more largely, a lower magnitude of
job ﬂows), as resulting of more stringent employment protection laws. This view is consistent with
a large bulk of empirical papers in the labor market literature showing that stringent employment
protection laws reduce job destruction (as well as job creation), as documented by Cahuc and
Zylberberg (2004). A similar interpretation of s is made by Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005). Table 5
reports the results.16
Product market regulations As shown in Table 5, product market regulations have a noticeable
eﬀect on international comovement. A larger degree of nominal price rigidity (i.e, a higher P)
raises the cross-country correlation of outputs and investments. This result has also been obtained
by Kollmann (2001) in a two-country model with nominal price and wage stickiness. We show that
it remains robust to the introduction of other types of market imperfections, notably labor market
search and matching frictions. Furthermore, it also holds regarding the predicted cross-country
15Our framework also allows to gauge the role of labor taxation. We then perform sensitivity analysis to labor
taxes 
w and 
f. We ﬁnd that heavier tax rates (either on the employer’s or the employee’s side) tend to increase
cross-country correlations of macroeconomic aggregates, as a higher unemployment beneﬁt ratio. This result may
be accounted for by similar reasons as for ub (detailed below), since heavier taxes also favor adjustment through the
extensive margin. However, for values of tax rates that lie within an empirically plausible range, the quantitative
eﬀects on international comovement are much less signiﬁcant than for ub. We consequently do not report the results
here, to focus on the role of the unemployment beneﬁt system. Results are available upon request.
16In Table 5, the highest calibrated value of ub reproduces the value of the ratio observed in France, while the
lowest value corresponds to US data. The highest calibrated value of s (0.08) implies a probability of ﬁnding a job for
an unemployed worker  = sN=(1   N) in steady-state in line with the observed mean duration of unemployment in
the US, equal to 4 months (over the period 1973-1998, based on data provided by the OECD). The lowest calibrated
value of s, corresponding to the highest degree of employment protection, is based on the estimates of Algan et al.
(2003) on French data. This calibration is consistent with the mean duration of unemployment observed in France
over 1973-1998, of around one year.
32Table 5: Product and labor market regulations and GDP comovement: the model’s predictions
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Price rigidity P Unempl. beneﬁt ratio ub Job destruction rate s
0 20 40 60 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.08 0.068 0.056 0.044
(Y1;Y2) 0.644 0.750 0.810 0.849 0.750 0.759 0.768 0.798 0.746 0.734 0.725 0.709
(Cc
1;Cc
2) 0.576 0.682 0.748 0.791 0.683 0.708 0.734 0.783 0.678 0.661 0.648 0.627
(Nh1;Nh2) 0.858 0.918 0.884 0.815 0.917 0.926 0.934 0.945 0.916 0.907 0.898 0.879
(Ic
1;Ic
2) 0.659 0.771 0.831 0.869 0.771 0.781 0.791 0.818 0.767 0.755 0.746 0.729
Notes: Simulated moments obtained with 500 simulations of monetary and technological innovations.
correlation of consumption. While product market regulations have no substantial impact on the
cross-country correlation of labor inputs, they contribute to enhance international comovement in
the various components of aggregate demands, as well as of outputs.
Generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt system As shown in Table 5, a more generous
unemployment beneﬁt system (i.e, a higher unemployment beneﬁt ratio ub) substantially raises
international comovement of the main macroeconomic aggregates. As the workers’ outside option
improves in the bargaining process, households are more reluctant to changes in wage and hours, and
adjustment to exogenous shocks occurs more through the extensive margin in both countries. Given
the time-consuming nature of search on the labor market, this induces more persistent responses
of total employment and output. In quantitative terms then, the more generous unemployment
beneﬁts, the larger the extent of international business cycles comovement.17
The degree of employment protection laws Conversely, Table 5 shows that more employment
protection (i.e. a lower job destruction rate) reduces the cross-country correlations of outputs, labor
inputs and aggregate demands components. More employment protection limits the magnitude of
job creation ﬂows in response to exogenous shocks. Firms in both countries then favor adjustments
to either supply or demand shocks through the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin.
Since the amount of worked hours is negotiated with households whose situation diﬀers among
countries hit by asymmetric shocks, more stringent EPL thus implies more divergent responses in
worked hours across countries. Given the limited responses of the employment stock, this leads
to more divergent and dampened responses of total employments and outputs across countries. In
quantitative terms, a higher degree in employment protection then results in lower cross-country
17This mechanism is strengthened by wealth eﬀects. More generous unemployment beneﬁts indeed raise the wealth
eﬀect induced either by supply or demand shocks in both countries whatever the country hit by the shock, consistently
with previous IRFs analysis. In case of positive shocks for instance, the sustained rise in world aggregate demand
induces more positive responses of outputs in both countries.
33correlations of the main macroeconomic variables. This result is in line with the empirical ﬁndings
of Artis et al. (2008) and Fonseca et al. (2008), which obtain that a higher degree of employment
protection signiﬁcantly reduces the cross-country GDP correlation among OECD countries.
Assessing the role of labor market institutions leads the following comments. First, the fact
that both dimensions of labor market institutions substantially aﬀect the magnitude of interna-
tional comovement, conﬁrms the role of labor market frictions in the international propagation of
shocks. Second, we show that the design of labor market regulations per se matters in the extent
of international comovement. The level of labor market institutions indeed aﬀects the economy’s
response to her own country-speciﬁc shocks, as well as to foreign shocks. The eﬀect is notably tied
to the way labor market regulations modify the magnitude of adjustments occurring through the
extensive margin relative to the intensive margin on the labor market. Previous reasoning sug-
gests that international comovement is enhanced when labor market adjustments occur primarily
through the extensive margin. As a result, since the various dimensions of labor market institutions
have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on these adjustments, they have diﬀerentiated impacts on the degree of
international interdependence as well. International business cycle comovement is thus found to in-
crease with more generous unemployment beneﬁts raise, while it is reduced by stringent employment
protection.
Empirical assessment One can then wonder whether these predictions are conﬁrmed by the
data. To verify this point, we empirically evaluate the eﬀects of product and labor market regulations
on the extent of business cycle synchronization within 20 OECD countries over the period 1964:1-
2003:4. Business cycle comovement is captured by the cross-country GDP correlation calculated
over the whole period for all country pairs (190 observations). We capture the role of labor and
product market regulations using information contained in the Economic Freedom database provided
by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). Precisely, we evaluate the eﬀects of the
unemployment beneﬁts generosity (denoted “Unempl. Ben. Index” hereafter), the strictness of
employment protection laws (“EPL Index”) and the extent of price controls (“Price Rig. Index”). For
each dimension and for each country pair (i;j), we use the sum of the two countries’ institutional
variables as our bilateral indicator of the extent of regulation within the pair, as in Artis et al.
(2008). Given the variables’ construction in the Economic Freedom database, the higher the bilateral
indicator, the lesser the extent of regulation.
We evaluate the empirical eﬀects of product and labor market regulations on cross-country GDP
correlation using OLS regressions written as:

y
ij =  + Regij + 
Xij + i + j + ij (29)
34where 
y
ij denotes the cross-counrty GDP correlation and Regij measures the extent of regulation
(in one of the three dimensions considered). We ensure the robustness of the link by adding a set
of control variables in the regression to eliminate potential omitted variables bias. The estimated
equation thus always includes country ﬁxed eﬀects (i and j in Equation (29)). Depending on the
speciﬁcation, it may also include a set of observable control variables that are likely to aﬀect inter-
national comovement (Xij in Equation (29)). Even though there is no consensus in the literature on
the key determinants of business cycles comovement, most related empirical papers acknowledge a
major role to bilateral trade (Frankel and Rose, 1998, Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005 or Artis et al.,
2008 among others). We accordingly retain this dimension here (denoted “Bilateral trade” in Table
6). We also include in the Xij set a dummy variable controlling for business cycle synchronization
between countries that joined the European Monetary Union in 1999 (denoted “Dummy EMU”
hereafter). Details on variables and sources are provided in Appendix A. Empirical results are
reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Product and labor market regulations and GDP comovement in the data
Dep. Variable: cross-country GDP correlation
Model : (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
Unempl. Ben. Index -0.206a -0.200a -0.193a
(0.032) (0.031) (0.025)
EPL Index 0.053a 0.054a 0.049a
(0.016) (0.023) (0.050)
Price Rig. Index -0.162a -0.158a -0.152a
(0.025) (0.024) (0.020)
Bilateral trade 0.053b 0.046b 0.053b 0.046b 0.053b 0.046b
(0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Dummy EMU 0.091c 0.091c 0.091c
(0.050) (0.016) (0.050)
Obs. 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190
R2 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.63
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a b and
c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at
the 1% 5% and 10% levels. Country ﬁxed eﬀects included.
As shown in Table 5, the model predicts that a more generous unemployment beneﬁt system
and a larger degree of price stickiness increase the cross-country GDP correlation. Conversely, more
stringent employment protection laws should reduce business cycle synchronization. In terms of
Equation (29), we thus expect negative signs for the  coeﬃcients respectively associated with the
Unemployment Beneﬁt Index (Columns (A) to (C)) and the Price Rigidity Index (Columns (F) to
(H)), and a positive sign for the  coeﬃcient associated with the EPL Index (Columns (C) to (E)).
Results reported in Table 6 conﬁrm the empirical relevance of the model’s predictions. The es-
timated coeﬃcients associated with product and market regulations are signiﬁcant and of expected
35sign. Besides, their eﬀects on GDP comovement are robust to the inclusion of unobservable and
observable control variables. When included, bilateral trade and adhesion to EMU are also esti-
mated signiﬁcant and of expected (positive) sign, as more bilateral trade and adhesion to EMU are
usually found to enhance business cycle comovement in the empirical literature (see Baxter and
Kouparitsas, 2005 or Artis et al., 2008 notably). Table 6 thus provides an empirical support to
our theoretical predictions, that more generous unemployment beneﬁts raise international business
cycle comovement, while more stringent employment protection has the opposite eﬀect.
6 Conclusion
This paper amends the New Open Economy Macroeconomy setting based on monopolistic competi-
tion and nominal rigidity, to introduce labor market search and matching frictions. We evaluate the
ability of this framework to account for the international propagation of shocks and international
business cycle synchronization.
Our results indicate that labor market search and matching frictions improve the ability of
the New Open Economy Macroeconomy framework to account for international business cycle co-
movement. In particular, they enable the NOEM model to be consistent with the international
propagation mechanism of monetary shocks identiﬁed in the data. In quantitative terms, they
enhance the magnitude of cross-country GDP correlation, while making the NOEM model also con-
sistent with main labor market cyclical properties. We also show that the design of labor market
policies matters. Yet, their impact is not unequivocal among the various dimensions of labor market
institutions, given their diﬀerentiated eﬀects on labor market dynamics. The extent of international
comovement is thus found to increase with the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁts system,
whereas it decreases with the strictness of employment protection. We conduct an econometric
exercise using data on OECD countries, which provides an empirical support to these predictions.
These results open the route to further enlargements. First, the cyclical behavior of the model’s
variables remains dominated by productivity shocks. This implies some unsatisfactory results,
notably too large predicted cross-country correlations of macroeconomic variables as compared to
the data. This suggests to introduce other types of demand shocks beyond monetary policy shocks.
Second, sensitivity analysis indicate that the design of labor market policies aﬀects the international
propagation of shocks, but not with a similar fashion depending of the dimension of labor market
institutions. This suggests to tackle the question in normative terms, asking for the “good design”
of labor market institutions in terms of welfare analysis. These points are left for further research.
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40A Data appendix: deﬁnitions and sources
A.1 Calibration
Calibration of the labor market institutions values (Table 2) is made so as to match the correspond-
ing average values observed in the United-States over the period 1980-2003, based on the dataset
on Labor Market Institutions provided by Nickell (2006). Precisely, we respectively use the “direct
tax rate” for w and the “Employment tax rate” for f (as denoted by Nickell). The calibration
of b=wh is based on the empirical ratio deﬁned as the average across the ﬁve years of unemploy-
ment for three family situations and two money levels. Nickell’s database provides other beneﬁt
replacement ratios, such as “brr1” that refers to the ﬁrst year of unemployment beneﬁts, averaged
over three family situations and two earnings levels. Calibrating on this ratio would imply higher
values than the one considered here. We investigate the role played by the degree of generosity of
the unemployment beneﬁt system in Section 5.
A.2 Empirical business cycle properties
This section details the sources of the empirical moments reported in Table 4. If not otherwise
speciﬁed, within-country moments are based on own calculations, using quarterly OECD BSD
database (taken in log and HP-ﬁltered) over the period 1973:1-1998:4. Series for worked hours
come from OECDstat. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies comes from Shimer
(2005), based on US data over the period 1950-2001. The correlation between unemployment and
inﬂation comes from Chéron and Langot (2000), based on US data over the period 1953:1-1990:3.
Cross-country correlations of output, consumption and investment come from Kollmann (2001), as
well as the nominal and real exchange rates volatilities, based on US data versus an aggregate of the
non-US G7 countries for the period 1973:1-1994:3. The cross-country correlation of employment
comes from Backus et al. (1995); it corresponds to the median value of a sample of 10 OECD
countries versus the US, for the period 1970-mid 1990s. Persistence of nominal and real exchange
rates come from Chari et al. (2002); it refers to exchange rates between the US and an aggregate of
9 European countries for the period 1973:1-2000:1.
A.3 GDP comovement and product and labor market regulations
This section details the deﬁnitions and sources of the variables used to obtain results in Table 6.
We use data coming from OECD databases (BSDB and Main Economic Indicators) to calculate
the cross-country GDP correlation. We consider quarterly series of GDP (at factor cost), in volume
at constant prices, over the period 1963:4-2003:4. 20 OECD countries are included in the sample:
41Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
the United States. Data inspection suggests a structural break on German data due to the German
reuniﬁcation, and another one on French data due to May 1968’s events (in 1968:2 and 1968:3) that
the model cannot account for. Based on the methodology proposed by Milliard, Scott, and Sensier
(1997), we detect outliers on the series converted into growth rates. This leads to identify one
outlier for German series (1990:1) two for the French ones (1968:2 and 1968:3 ). The corresponding
points in the series taken in growth rates are replaced by averaging the closest growth rates. The
GDP series are then converted back into level. Bilateral correlations for the 190 country pairs of
the sample are calculated on GDP series taken in log and ﬁltered according to the Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) methodology.
Data coming from the Fraser Institute are available on the website http://www.freetheworld.com.
We use the 2005 edition of the Economic Freedom of the World Annual report. Variables are con-
structed to take values over the range [0;10], decreasing with the strength of regulation. Deﬁnition
of the variables used in the regressions is the following.
- Unemployment Beneﬁts Index: The indicator is constructed by Gwartney and Lawson
(2006) using data from the World Competitiveness Yearbook published by the International
Institute for Management Development. It indicates whether the unemployment beneﬁts
system preserves the incentive to work, with low values meaning that the unemployment
beneﬁt system has pernicious eﬀects. Information is provided for years 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2003.
- EPL Index is measured using the “Hiring and Firing Practices” indicator, which is con-
structed using data from the Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Eco-
nomic Forum. It indicates whether hiring and ﬁring practices of companies are determined by
private contract, with low values meaning that ﬁring and hiring laws are more constraining.
Information is provided for years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2002.
- Price Rigidity Index is measured using the “Price Controls” Indicator which measures the
extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices. It is constructed using survey data
of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), World Competitiveness
Report. The more widespread the use of price controls, the lower the rating. Information on
this variable is provided for years 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2003.
For each variable, we take the mean value of the period of data coverage for each country of the
42sample. This may be a concern for the EPL and Price Rigidity Indices, since the period coverage
of both variables starts in the 1990s while they are aimed to explain the cross-country correlation
over 1964-2003. This raises a potential problem of reversed causality. We do not view it as a serious
concern though, since it is not likely to be the case that medium-run variables as GDP cross-
correlation aﬀect the evolution of structural variables like product and labor market institutions.
Besides, institutional variables typically display much lower time variabililty than macroeconomic
variables such as GDP. However, we tried to address this problem by using series for institutional
variables with an expanded time coverage. As for employment protection, we use the Employment
Protection Indicator built by the OECD on a yearly basis starting in 1960 and provided by Nickell
(2006). Preliminary experiments show that this variable is signiﬁcant in simple OLS regression but
not robust to the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects. Nickell’s dataset also provides some measures
of product market regulations, but with data coverage starting in 1998 hence subject to similar
concerns. As robustness check though, we run regressions using the “product market regulations”
indicator provided by Nickell’s database (denoted “pmr” in Nickell’s database). We obtain similar
results to those obtained with the Economic Freedom variables.
The computation of bilateral trade intensity is taken from the database provided by Darvas et al.
(2005). It is available on Andrew Rose’s web page: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm.
We use the measure of bilateral trade intensity, reported to the total of GDPs in both countries,
averaged over the period 1964-2003 (“trdgdp1” in their database). The dummy variable controlling
for adhesion to EMU takes the value 1 if the two countries of a given pair are among the following:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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